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 This case raises significant jurisdictional and federalism issues that deserve 
the Court’s careful consideration.  At issue is a sweeping “Declaratory Order” 
untethered to any adjudicatory or rulemaking proceeding before the Surface 
Transportation Board (“STB”).
1
  In that order, STB overstepped its narrowly-
defined statutory role in an attempt to override the preclusive legal effect of a final 
judgment of the California Court of Appeal and to inject itself into an unrelated 
case currently pending before the California Supreme Court over which it has no 
regulatory jurisdiction or institutional competence.  In the latter proceeding, 
California’s highest court must determine whether the state’s bedrock 
environmental disclosure statute – the California Environmental Quality Act 
(“CEQA”) – applies to a public railroad repair project.  The fact-specific issues 
raised by that case cannot be properly adjudicated through this Court’s review of 
STB’s advisory opinion, which seeks to expand its own jurisdiction well beyond 
anything Congress envisioned.   
 Amicus Curiae Center for Biological Diversity, which has an abiding 
interest in proper implementation of CEQA, submits this brief to elaborate on three 
                                            
1
 California High-Speed Rail Authority—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 
35861, 2014 WL 7149612 (Dec. 12, 2014). 
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points not fully addressed in Petitioners’ Opening Brief.
2
  First, STB’s Declaratory 
Order is not judicially reviewable because it constitutes (1) a backdoor collateral 
attack on the preclusive effect of a final state court judgment over which this Court 
lacks original jurisdiction and (2) a non-binding advisory opinion, not a judicially-
reviewable final action, under the test articulated in Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 
154, 177 (1997).  But even if the Declaratory Order is reviewable, the Court should 
abstain from doing so until resolution of the parallel California Supreme Court 
case, which has been fully briefed and is awaiting argument.  Finally, if this Court 
reaches the merits, it should conclude that STB’s interpretation is inconsistent with 
the plain language and intent of the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination 
Act (“Termination Act”) and is not entitled to deference.  
BACKGROUND  
The Declaratory Order offers STB’s “views” on application of the 
Termination Act’s remedy preemption provision to California’s foundational 
environmental disclosure law for all public agency decision-making.  2014 WL 
7149612, *3.  Judicial review of STB’s legal interpretation requires a more 
                                            
2
 Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(c)(5), the Center certifies that its counsel 
authored this brief in its entirety.  No person, other than the Amicus Curiae, its 
members, or its counsel, contributed money that was intended to fund 
the preparation or submission of this brief.  Although not required by the rules, 
counsel for the Center also disclose that they represent petitioners in Californians 
for Alternative to Toxics, pending before the California Supreme Court.  Those 
petitioners, however, played no role in the preparation or funding of this brief.  
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thorough analysis of the law and a fuller understanding of the relevant state court 
proceedings than the Declaratory Order provides.                     
I.   The History of State and Federal Railroad Regulation.    
In crafting the Termination Act and its predecessors, Congress has focused 
exclusively on the economic viability of the evolving railroad system, including 
specific concerns about the destabilizing effect of state rate regulation and state-
mandated overbuilding or expansion of rail lines.  As it stands today, the 
Termination Act gives STB carefully-circumscribed exclusive jurisdiction to (1) 
adjudicate complaints concerning discriminatory rates or practices by common 
carriers and (2) certify certain infrastructure activities – i.e., new line construction, 
existing line extensions, operator status changes, and line acquisition or 
abandonment – as part of the interstate rail network.  Contrary to STB’s expansive 
reading of the Act, Congress did not intend to invest the agency with plenary 
railroad regulatory or planning powers that usurp a state’s ability to make decisions 
about how it spends money or what state law conditions attach to such 
expenditures. 
A. The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 
American railroads were originally state-chartered and regulated pursuant to 
  Case: 15-71780, 12/28/2015, ID: 9807519, DktEntry: 35-1, Page 15 of 64
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historic state police powers.
3
  Early state regulatory efforts included attempts, 
largely unsuccessful, to curb monopolistic behavior and corruption in the rapidly-
expanding rail industry.
4
  After the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Illinois’ 
ability to regulate freight rates on interstate routes, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. 
Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886), the federal government stepped in to regulate the 
economics of railroads with adoption of the Interstate Commerce Act (“ICA”) in 
1887.   
The ICA was intended to protect shippers from the monopoly power of a rail 
industry fraught with market manipulation and rate discrimination.  Sen. Rep. No. 
104-176, at 2 (1995).  The statute outlawed rebates and pooling, forced railroads to 
publish rates, and required the new Interstate Commerce Commission 
                                            
3
 Zachary Smith, Tailor-Made: State Regulation at the Periphery of Federal Law, 
36 Transp. L.J. 335, 338 (2009) (citing James Ely, Jr., Railroads and American 
Law (2001); Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: 
Federalism and the Railroad Problem, 97 Yale L.J. 1017, 1034 n.90 (1988) (the rail 
system developed through “state initiative and almost exclusively under state 
control” and “before 1887 federal regulation was virtually nonexistent”). 
4 James W. Ely, Jr., “The Railroad System Has Burst Through State Limits”: 
Railroads and Interstate Commerce, 1830-1920, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 933 (2003) 
(“Ely”); Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission: The Tortuous Path from Regulation to Deregulation of America’s 
Infrastructure, 95 Marq. L. Rev. 1151, 1152 (2012) (“Dempsey I”) (“Congress [in 
1887] instituted regulation under the ICC largely to protect the public from the 
monopolistic abuses of the railroads.  Between 1920 and 1975, however, the goal 
of the national transportation policy shifted to protection of the transportation 
industry from . . . unconstrained competition.”); Paul Stephen Dempsey, 
Transportation: A Legal History, 30 Transp. L.J. 235, 254-65 (2003) (“Dempsey 
II”).  
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(“Commission”) to ensure that rail fees were “just and reasonable.”  See id.; Smith 
at 339-40; Dempsey II at 265; Hovenkamp at 1035.  Over the next few decades, 
Congress responded to early, narrow judicial interpretations of the ICA by 
enlarging the Commission’s authority for interstate rail rates.  Hovenkamp at 1035-
44; Ely at 966-67; Dempsey I at 1163-64.   
B.   The Transportation Act of 1920 
As the railroad industry matured, new economic concerns arose, related 
primarily to the different circumstances faced by fiercely competitive long-haul 
routes and often monopolistic short-haul routes.  “Monopoly railroads earned 
monopoly profits, while competing railroads were driven into bankruptcy,” 
Hovenkamp at 1035-44, and state regulatory attempts to limit monopoly profits 
from lucrative intrastate routes threatened the viability of the interstate system, 
which depended on those profits.  Thus, in crafting the Transportation Act of 1920 
to amend the ICA, Congress’ concern “shifted from one of protecting the public 
from the market abuses of the transportation industry to one of preserving a healthy 
economic environment for common carriers.”  Dempsey II at 272.   
The amended statute attempted to address perceived “freeriding by the 
states,” which imposed low intrastate rail rates and intrastate route mandates at the 
expense of the industry’s overall financial viability.  Ely at 976 (citing R.R. 
Comm’n of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U.S. 563, 588 (1922)).  It 
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did so by augmenting the Commission’s powers, allowing it to supervise the rail 
industry’s issuance of securities and to regulate intrastate rates affecting interstate 
commerce.  Ely at 974; Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. Co. v. United States, 263 U.S. 
456, 478 (1924).  The statute also provided “that no interstate carrier shall 
undertake the extension of its line of railroad or the construction of a new line of 
railroad, or shall acquire or operate any line of railroad, or extension thereof, or 
shall engage in transportation over such additional or extended line of railroad 
unless and until the Commission shall certify that public convenience present or 
future requires it, and that no carrier shall abandon all or any portion of its line or 
the operation of it without a similar certificate of approval.”  R.R. Comm’n of Cal. 
v. S. Pac. Co. 264 U.S. 331, 344 (1924) (discussing paragraphs 18 to 21 of section 
402).  By requiring federal authorization for new construction, expansion, and 
operation of rail lines, Congress intended both to prevent overbuilding of 
expensive infrastructure and to bar “states from requiring carriers to provide 
service at a loss, a step which contradicted the national policy of building a strong 
rail system.”  Ely at 974-75.   
Despite its ability to regulate interstate rates and its new certification 
authority for line construction and expansion, the Commission still lacked direct 
authority to regulate intrastate rail rates, and the Transportation Act also explicitly 
exempted from the new infrastructure certification requirements “the construction 
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or abandonment of spur, industrial, team, switching or side tracks, located or to be 
located wholly within one state.”  R.R. Comm’n of Cal., 264 U.S. at 345 (quoting 
paragraph 22 of section 402).   
C.  The Staggers Rail Act of 1980 
Following the rise of competing forms of transportation and a series of 
railroad bankruptcies, Congress took up the industry’s economic viability once 
again in the Staggers Rail Act of 1980.  See generally Maureen E. Eldredge, Who’s 
Driving the Train? Railroad Regulation and Local Control, 75 U. Colo. L.Rev. 
549, 558 (2004).  This statutory amendment “began the substantial economic 
deregulation of the surface transportation industry and the whittling away of the 
size and scope of the [Commission],” H.R. Rep. No. 104-311, at 82 (1995), by 
extensively reforming the Commission’s authority, allowing increased competition 
in the rail industry, and easing the way for mergers and abandonment of rail lines 
and operations.  Sen. Rep. No. 104-176 at 3.  The Staggers Act “deregulated most 
railroad rates, legalized railroad shipping contracts, simplified abandonments, and 
stimulated an explosion of service and marketing alternatives.”  H.R. Rep. No. 
104-311, at 91.   
But even after this considerable overhaul, states retained a role in economic 
regulation, albeit with federal oversight.  The Staggers Act allowed states to 
exercise “jurisdiction over intrastate rates, classifications, rules, and practices for 
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intrastate transportation” if they submitted “intrastate regulatory rate standards and 
procedures” to the Commission for review and certification.  Pub. L. 96-448, 
§ 214(b), 94 Stat. 1895 (Oct. 14, 1980) (formerly 49 U.S.C. § 11501(b)).  To 
effectuate this provision, Congress for the first time expressly preempted state 
economic regulation of railroads (rates, schedules, classifications, etc.) unless the 
Commission certified the state rules.  This new preemption language, codified in 
section 10501(d), provided:  
The jurisdiction of the Commission and of State authorities (to the extent 
such authorities are authorized to administer the standards and procedures of 
this title pursuant to this section and section 11501(b) of this title) over 
transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies provided in this title with 
respect to the rates, classifications, rules, and practices of such carriers, is 
exclusive.   
 
Id. (formerly 49 U.S.C. § 10501(d)).   
The Conference Report explained that this provision preempted only state 
financial regulation of the industry:  
The Conferees’ intent is to ensure that the price and service flexibility and 
revenue adequacy goals of the Act are not undermined by state regulation of 
rates, practices, etc., which are not in accordance with these goals.  
Accordingly, the Act preempts state authority over rail rates, classifications, 
rules, and practices.  States may only regulate in these areas if they are 
certified under the procedures of this section. 
 
The remedies available against rail carriers with respect to rail rates, 
classifications, rules and practices are exclusively those provided by the 
Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, and any other federal statutes which 
are not inconsistent with the Interstate Commerce Act.  No state law or 
federal or state common law remedies are available. 
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H.R. Rep. No. 96-1430, at 106 (1980) (Conf. Rep.).  The Staggers Act thus made 
clear that state legislatures and state courts could not regulate railroad economics, 
even on intrastate lines, without federal concurrence.   
The Staggers Act did not, however, substantively change the provisions of 
the earlier Transportation Act governing federal supervision over construction, 
extension, and abandonment of lines.  New sections 10901 through 10906 of the 
amended statute merely recodified the requirement (from section 402, paragraphs 
18-21 of the Transportation Act) that federal “public convenience and necessity” 
approval was required for construction, extension, acquisition, operation, and 
abandonment of lines connected to the interstate system (and thus under the 
Commission’s jurisdiction).  Pub. L. 96-448, § 214(b).  And new section 10907 
reiterated (from section 402, paragraph 22 of the Transportation Act) that “[t]he 
Commission does not have authority under sections 10901-10906 of this title over . 
. . the construction, requisition, operation, abandonment or discontinuance of spur, 
industrial, team, switching or side tracks if the tracks are located, or intended to be 
located, entirely in one state.”  Id.  
D.   The Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995 
With the Termination Act of 1995, Congress completed the economic 
deregulation begun under the Staggers Act, further curtailing federal regulatory 
authority over the railroad industry.  The new law repealed many of the 
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Commission’s historic economic regulatory functions, including tariff filing, rail 
fare regulation, financial assistance programs, and minimum rate regulation.  H.R. 
Rep. No. 104-311, at 82-83.  As Congress noted, the only federal regulatory 
authority retained in the Termination Act is the authority “necessary to maintain a 
‘safety net’ or ‘backstop’ of remedies to address problems of rates, access to 
facilities, and industry restructuring.”  H.R. Rep. No. 104-311, at 93.  To effectuate 
this economic deregulation, the Termination Act did away with the Commission 
and replaced it with the more narrowly-empowered STB. 
To prevent states from stepping back into the field of economic regulation 
and undermining Congress’ deregulation efforts, the Termination Act withdrew all 
state authority to regulate interstate rates and simultaneously “extend[ed] exclusive 
Federal jurisdiction to matters relating to spur, industrial, team, switching or side 
tracks formerly reserved for State jurisdiction under former section 10907.”  Id. at 
95.
5
  “This changed the federal government’s relationship with the states, which 
had previously played a meaningful role in regulating railroad rates and 
operations.”  Carter H. Strickland, Jr., Revitalizing the Presumption Against 
Preemption to Prevent Regulatory Gaps: Railroad Deregulation and Waste 
Transfer Stations, 34 Ecology L.Q. 1147, 1161 (2007).   
                                            
5
 Notably, while the Termination Act conveyed exclusive federal jurisdiction over 
such spurs and side tracks, it explicitly allowed carriers to enter into private 
contracts regarding the use of those facilities and excepted them from STB “public 
convenience and necessity” licensing authority.  49 U.S.C. § 10906.  
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While the Termination Act thus consolidated exclusive federal jurisdiction 
over the economics of railroad operations, it did not substantively change the 
narrow breadth of federal licensing jurisdiction over railroad infrastructure.  
Today, STB has two functions.  First, it retains its historic authority to prescribe 
reasonable rates, classifications, rules, and practices for common carriers 
connected to the interstate rail system and to adjudicate disputes over common 
carrier obligations – now expanded to both interstate and intrastate carriers.  49 
U.S.C. §§ 10701-10747 (rates) and 11101-11164 (operations).  And second, STB 
may grant or deny applications for “public convenience and necessity” 
certifications authorizing construction of line extensions or new lines, 
abandonment or acquisition of existing lines, or changes in operator status (except 
with respect to spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks, which are entirely 
guided by private contract and decision-making).  Id. §§ 10901-10910 (licensing).
6
  
STB’s enforcement authority is likewise limited; it may undertake an investigation 
in response to a carrier or shipper complaint and bring (or ask the Attorney General 
                                            
6
 In 2008, Congress amended the statute again, through the Clean Railroads Act, to 
specifically address solid waste rail transfer facilities.  49 U.S.C. §§ 10908-10910.  
While these provisions are not at issue here, they demonstrate that when Congress 
wants to step in and micromanage state and local land use decisions, it can and will 
do so.  It is telling that Congress has never attempted to override state or local 
siting criteria except in the context of solid waste facilities (and even then, 
Congress provided a “savings clause” in section 10910 for “State and local 
environmental, public health, and public safety standards” that do not violate 
dormant Commerce Clause standards).     
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to bring) civil actions to enjoin violations of licensing requirements or orders.  49 
U.S.C. §§ 11701-11703.
7
  STB has no authority, however, to engage in rail system 
planning or to command that private or public railroads construct, expand, or repair 
rail lines.  In other words, STB’s statutory jurisdiction is narrow and specific, not 
“plenary.”            
The Termination Act included several conforming changes “to reflect the 
direct and complete pre-emption of State economic regulations of railroads,” H.R. 
Rep. No. 104-311, at 95-96: 
(1) deleting the language of prior section 10501(b) regarding federal 
certification requirements for state rate-setting because state rate-setting 
is no longer allowed;  
 
(2) moving the “jurisdiction” and “preemption” language of prior section 
10501(d) into section 10501(b); and 
 
(3) deleting prior section 10907 language that exempted the construction or 
extension of wholly intrastate rail lines from federal licensing 
certification and adding new language to revised section 10501(b) to 
clarify that “the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, or 
discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks, or 
facilities, even if the tracks are located, or intended to be located, 
entirely in one State” in order to clarify that states do not play a role in 
“public convenience and necessity” certifications.  
 
See H.R. Rep. No. 104-422, at 167 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (“In light of the exclusive 
Federal authority over auxiliary tracks and facilities, this subject is integrated into 
                                            
7
 Injured persons also may bring their own civil suit to enforce the statute.  49 
U.S.C. §§ 11704-11707.  The statute provides specific civil and criminal penalties 
for violations.  Id. §§ 11901-11908. 
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the statement of general jurisdiction.”); S. Rep. No. 104-176, at 6 (1995) (“The bill 
would also eliminate Federal certification and review procedures for State 
regulation of intrastate rail transportation.”). 
Reflecting these changes and the overall structure of the revised statute, the 
recodified jurisdiction/preemption clause now provides: 
The jurisdiction of the Board over— 
 
(1) transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies provided in this part 
with respect to rates, classifications, rules (including car service, 
interchange, and other operating rules), practices, routes, services, and 
facilities of such carriers; and 
 
(2)   the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, or 
discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks, or 
facilities, even if the tracks are located, or intended to be located, 
entirely in one State,   
 
is exclusive.  Except as otherwise provided in this part, the remedies 
provided under this part with respect to regulation of rail transportation are 
exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under Federal or State law. 
 
49 U.S.C. §10501(b).  Thus, like the Staggers Act, the Termination Act ensured 
that the remedies provided in Part A (§§10101- 11908) preempt all other state and 
federal remedies “with respect to rates, classifications, rules, practices, routes, 
services, and facilities” for the “regulation of rail transportation.”  Id. § 10501(b). 
As to the addition of section 10501(b)(2), Congress explained that it did not 
convey plenary STB jurisdiction over all aspects of construction – or pre-
construction.  Rather, the new language was intended solely to extend STB’s 
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economic regulatory jurisdiction to activities on wholly intrastate lines that had 
previously been subject to federally-certified state regulation:   
The changes include extending exclusive Federal jurisdiction to matters 
relating to spur, industrial, team, switching or side tracks formerly reserved 
for State jurisdiction under former section 10907.  The former disclaimer 
regarding residual State police powers is eliminated as unnecessary, in view 
of the Federal policy of occupying the entire field of economic regulation of 
the interstate rail transportation system.  Although States retain the police 
powers reserved by the Constitution, the Federal scheme of economic 
regulation and deregulation is intended to address and encompass all such 
regulation and to be completely exclusive. 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 104-311, at 95-96 (emphasis added).   
II.   The California High-Speed Rail Authority Litigation. 
 The California High-Speed Rail project has a long planning history, dating 
back to the early 1990s.  See Town of Atherton v. California High-Speed Rail 
Authority (“Atherton”), 228 Cal. App. 4th 314, 323-26 (2014); Cal. Pub. Util. 
Code § 185010 (1996).  As planning efforts progressed, California sought and 
obtained voter approval for general obligation bonds to begin funding a High-
Speed Rail system.  In November 2008, voters approved ballot Proposition 1A, 
authorizing the use of revenue from these bonds for further planning, engineering, 
and construction of the system.  Cal. Sts. & High. Code § 2704.04.  The ballot 
proposition provided that prior to seeking appropriation of the bond proceeds for 
any segment of the system, the California High-Speed Rail Authority (“Authority”) 
must prepare and submit a detailed funding plan that demonstrates, among other 
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things, completion of all project-level environmental review necessary to proceed 
with construction.  Id. § 2704.08(c)(2)(K). 
 To comply with their respective obligations under CEQA and the National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), the Authority and the Federal Railroad 
Administration
8
 completed a joint programmatic Environmental Impact 
Report/Environmental Impact Statement (“EIR/EIS”) for the project in 2008, 
which then became the subject of various judicial challenges.  Atherton, 228 Cal. 
App. 4th at 325-26.  In 2011, the trial court agreed, but only in part, with the 
challengers’ claim that the programmatic EIR/EIS was inadequate and set aside the 
Authority’s resolution certifying the document; the challengers appealed the partial 
denial of their writ claims.  Id. at 327.   
 While this state appeal was pending, the Authority simultaneously sought 
two rulings from STB.  On March 27, 2013, the Authority filed both (1) a Petition 
for Exemption from the Termination Act’s application requirements for 
construction of a new rail line under 49 U.S.C. § 10901, and (2) a Motion to 
                                            
8
  The Federal Railroad Administration is an agency within the U.S. Department of 
Transportation, created by statute in 1966, whose stated mission is “to enable the 
safe, reliable, and efficient movement of people and goods.”  See https://www.fra. 
dot.gov/Page/P0002.  In anticipation of providing some federal funding for the 
High-Speed Rail project, it served as “lead agency” under NEPA.  As noted above, 
STB is an entirely different, independent executive agency charged by the 
Termination Act with limited railroad licensing and common carrier dispute 
resolution authority.   
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Dismiss its own concurrently filed Petition for Exemption.
9
  The Petition explained 
in detail how the Authority and the Federal Railroad Administration had partnered 
to complete an extensive tiered CEQA/NEPA process for the project, Petition for 
Exemption at 5-9, and requested “exemption” from Termination Act requirements 
on the grounds that the High-Speed Rail system will facilitate passenger rail 
transportation as Congress intended.  Id. at 9-13.  The Petition argued that 
regulation by STB was “not needed to protect shippers from the abuse of market 
power” because the line will not service shippers and thus regulation to “safeguard 
against the potential for market power abuse is unwarranted.”  Id. at 13.  In its 
simultaneously-filed Motion to Dismiss, the Authority argued that construction of 
the project was exempt from STB prior approval because it will be located entirely 
within California and will not be operated as part of an interstate rail network.  
Motion to Dismiss at 5-8.      
 In response, STB concluded that it did have jurisdiction over the High-Speed 
Rail project and thus denied the Authority’s Motion to Dismiss.  California High-
Speed Rail Authority—Construction Exemption—Merced, Madera & Fresno 
Ctys., Cal., FD 35724, 2013 WL 1701795, at *2 (Apr. 18, 2013).  After further 
                                            
9
  All of the Authority’s filings with STB are available on the STB website at 
http://www.stb.dot.gov/FILINGS/all_search.nsf/%28search-98.234.191.241-
68285%29?OpenView&Count=5000.  Amici Curiae requests that the Court take 
judicial notice of these filings.  Fed. R. Evid. 201.   
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consideration of the joint programmatic and project-specific EIR/EISs and the 
Federal Railroad Administration’s Record of Decision and Mitigation Plan, and 
after purportedly conducting an independent review of the environmental 
documents, STB granted the Petition for Exemption and approved the new 
construction without a full Termination Act application process.  California High-
Speed Rail Authority—Construction Exemption—Merced, Madera & Fresno 
Ctys., Cal., FD 35724, 2013 WL 3053064 (June 13, 2013).  In declining to, as 
some commenters urged, “revisit the determinations on the viability and 
desirability of the Project already made by these various Federal, state, and local 
government interests,” STB explained that 
The Board’s grant of authority to construct a rail line (whether under § 
10901 or by exemption under § 10502) is permissive, and not mandatory—
that is, the Board does not require that an approved line be built. . . . 
investors rather than the Board will determine if a proposed line will be 
financially viable.   
 
[F]unding decisions have already been made by bodies directly empowered 
to make those decisions, including FRA and the voters of California. Neither 
our statute nor Board or court precedent suggest that we must use the full 
application process of § 10901 to revisit or override those decisions, 
particularly given the significant amount of public information and 
participation regarding the funding decisions available in this case. 
Id. at *12-13 (emphasis added). 
 In the meantime, briefing of the challengers’ state court CEQA appeal 
proceeded.  After the appeal had been fully briefed and calendared for argument, 
the Authority requested – and the appellate court granted – a continuance of the 
  Case: 15-71780, 12/28/2015, ID: 9807519, DktEntry: 35-1, Page 29 of 64
18 
 
hearing and supplemental briefing on the potential preemptive effect of STB’s 
decision to exercise jurisdiction over the project (but exempt it from full review).  
Atherton, 228 Cal. App. 4th at 328-29.  Following supplemental briefing and 
argument, the Court of Appeal issued a lengthy opinion on July 24, 2014, finding 
(1) no preemption under the Termination Act and (2) no merit to challengers’ 
CEQA claims.  The Court noted that STB’s decisions made no mention of 
preemption, let alone a finding of preemption.  Id. at 333.  It explained, moreover, 
that California’s publicly-funded High-Speed Rail project differed from the local 
private railroad regulatory permitting cases on which the Authority relied in its 
belated preemption arguments, concluding that “[i]t is less clear and certainly 
subject to dispute whether requiring review under CEQA before deciding on the 
alignment of the [rail line] from the Central Valley to the San Francisco Bay Area 
has a comparable potential effect to deny the railroad the ability to conduct its 
operations and activities.”  Id.  The Court concluded that “[w]e need not, however, 
wade further into these weeds” because, even if CEQA were generally preempted 
by the Termination Act, the public High-Speed Rail project is excepted from 
preemption under the “market participation doctrine.”  Id. 333-41.       
  Unhappy with this ruling, the Authority filed a Petition for Declaratory 
Order with STB on October 9, 2014, rather than seeking further judicial review.  In 
that Petition, the Authority argued that because STB has “exclusive and plenary” 
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jurisdiction over construction of new rail lines and because a CEQA citizen suit 
could potentially delay such construction, the Termination Act preempts any 
injunctive relief available under state law.  Petition for Declaratory Order at 9-10.  
Notably, the Authority limited its request to STB review of injunctive relief under 
CEQA, stating that STB “need not rule generally on whether CEQA in its entirety 
is preempted by the [Termination Act] . . . because the CEQA process is 
complete.”  Id. (also explaining that “the Authority does not seek declaratory relief 
regarding non-injunctive remedies, such as an order requiring revised 
environmental analyses or additional environmental mitigation but no work 
stoppage”).   
 In granting the petition and issuing the Declaratory Order at issue here, STB 
went well beyond what the Authority sought.  It concluded that “CEQA is 
categorically preempted by § 10501(b) in connection with this Line,” Declaratory 
Order, 2014 WL 7149612, at *7, “because environmental review under CEQA 
attempts to regulate where, how, and under what conditions the Authority may 
construct the Line.”  Id. at *9.  Acknowledging that the state law requirements of 
Proposition 1A informed the Court of Appeal’s decision in Atherton and that those 
requirements implicated sovereignty concerns regarding the state’s ability to 
dictate the terms of its publicly-funded projects, STB correctly declined to “opine” 
on these issues.  Id. at *11 (“Whether CEQA compliance is required before the 
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Authority is allowed to obtain or use Proposition 1A funding is a question of state 
law for a state court to decide.”)  Yet STB concluded that CEQA is “categorically 
preempted” notwithstanding these pivotal state law concerns. 
 In response to a motion for reconsideration of the Declaratory Order by 
some of the Petitioners here, the dissenting member of the three-person STB 
observed that the two-person majority “gratuitously” made a “questionable finding 
that no one even sought” that the Termination Act categorically preempted CEQA.  
California High-Speed Rail Authority—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 35861, 
2015 WL 2070594, at *6 (May 4, 2015); see also Declaratory Order, 2014 WL 
7149612, at *12 (order is “overreaching” and STB should decline to issue the 
order).  The dissenting member pointedly objected that “there is now no means of 
enforcing CEQA with respect to the Project,” and “deviations from any of the 
CEQA provisions included in the Board’s own-approved EIR/EISs will not be 
challengeable.”  Id. at *13. 
III.   The North Coast Railroad Authority Litigation. 
Separate and unrelated to the High-Speed Rail matter, another CEQA case 
concerning a massive repair and rehabilitation project for a dilapidated railroad 
along the North Coast of California, from Lombard in Napa County to Arcata in 
Humboldt County, has been working its way through the state courts.  After the 
private rail carrier failed and the North Coast line fell into disrepair, the California 
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Legislature created the North Coast Railroad Authority (“NCRA”), a public 
agency, to acquire and rehabilitate the line and to provide rail service.  Cal. Gov’t 
Code § 93000 et seq.  Following storm-related damage to the line in 1998, the 
Federal Railroad Administration issued an emergency order closing the railroad as 
unsafe.  The California Legislature stepped in again, this time authorizing over $60 
million to fund repairs, improvements, and remediation of rail-related toxic 
contamination.  Id. §§ 14556.40(a)(32), 14556.50.  To obtain the money, NCRA 
contractually assumed responsibility for applicable legal requirements, including 
compliance with CEQA.  The state awarded NCRA more than $2 million to 
prepare an Environmental Impact Report for the repair project, and NCRA 
engaged in a four-year CEQA process.  Friends of Eel River v. North Coast 
Railroad Auth., 230 Cal. App. 4th 85, 95-100, 178 Cal. Rptr. 3d 752, 760-63, as 
modified on denial of reh’g (Oct. 17, 2014), review granted and opinion 
superseded sub nom. Friends of the Eel River v. N. Coast R.R. Auth., 339 P.3d 329 
(Cal. 2014) (hereinafter “Eel River”).   
While these efforts were ongoing, in 2006 NCRA entered into a lease with 
private contractor Northwestern Pacific Railroad Company (“Northwestern 
Pacific”) to operate the line, an agreement that became effective once the CEQA 
process was completed.  178 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 762.  Although STB did not have or 
exercise Termination Act jurisdiction over NCRA’s proposed repair and reopening 
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of the North Coast line,
10
 lessee Northwestern Pacific filed a notice of exemption 
for a change in operator on the line.  STB granted Northwestern Pacific’s 
Termination Act exemption for a change in operator status “upon consummation of 
the transaction.”  Northwestern Pacific R.R. Co.—Change in Operators 
Exemption—North Coast R.R. Auth., Sonoma-Marin Area Rail Transit Dist. & 
Nw. Pac. Ry. Co., LLC, FIN 35073, 2007 WL 2407261 (Aug. 16, 2007) 
Unrelated to STB’s action, Friends of the Eel River and Californians for 
Alternatives to Toxics filed lawsuits in state superior court challenging the 
adequacy of NCRA’s final Environmental Impact Report under CEQA (unlike the 
High-Speed Rail project, there was no parallel NEPA document for the North 
Coast repair project).  NCRA removed the cases to federal court, claiming that the 
Termination Act completely preempted petitioners’ state law CEQA claims, and 
the environmental groups moved to remand to state court.  Californians for 
Alternatives to Toxics v. North Coast Railroad Authority, No. C-11-04102 JCS, 
2012 WL 1610756 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2012).  The federal district court granted the 
                                            
10
 The courts and STB agree that the Termination Act does not provide federal 
jurisdiction over repair activities.  Lee’s Summit, MO v. Surface Transp. Bd., 231 
F.3d 39, 42 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Detroit/Wayne County Port Authority v. I.C.C., 
59 F.3d 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Swanson Rail Transfer, LB—Declaratory Order—
Swanson Rail Yard Terminal, Fed Carr. Case. P37354, 2011 WL 2356468, *2 
(June 14, 2011); Union Pac. R.R. Co.—Petition for Declaratory Order—
Rehabilitation of Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Between Jude and Ogden 
Junction, TX, 1998 WL 525587, *3-4 (Aug. 19, 1998) (citing Texas & Pacific v. 
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry., 270 U.S. 266 (1926)). 
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remand motion, finding that the Termination Act did not confer jurisdiction on 
STB to hear state law CEQA claims (i.e., there is no “complete preemption” under 
the statute) and that NCRA’s affirmative defense of preemption did not confer 
federal question jurisdiction on the district court.  Id. 
The preemption issue was subsequently litigated in the state trial court, and 
the CEQA claims were dismissed on preemption grounds.  The trial court 
judgment was affirmed on appeal, Eel River, 178 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 783, and the 
California Supreme Court granted review.  Briefing in the California Supreme 
Court concluded in October 2015, and the case is awaiting oral argument.  
(Notably, after the high court accepted Eel River for review, the Authority sought 
and obtained a stay in all seven CEQA challenges related to the High-Speed Rail 
project, pending the California Supreme Court’s decision.  See Authority’s Notice 
of Motion and Motion for Stay of Action (Feb. 19, 2015), attached to the 
Declaration of Deborah A. Sivas.)  
On November 19, 2015, in an attempted end-run around the pending 
California Supreme Court proceeding, Northwestern Pacific filed a Petition for 
Expedited Declaratory Order asking STB to declare that the Termination Act 
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preempts CEQA’s application to operation of the North Coast line.
11
  That petition 
had not yet been resolved. 
ARGUMENT 
I.  STB’s Declaratory Order Is an Improper Collateral Attack on Atherton 
for Which There Is No Federal Question Jurisdiction and No Hobbs Act 
or APA Judicial Review. 
 
As demonstrated above, the Declaratory Order at issue here is not connected 
to STB enforcement under the Termination Act or agency adjudication under the 
Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”).
12
  At best, it is an advisory opinion, 
issued by STB “to provide [its] views on the preemption issue.”  2014 WL 
7149612, at *3.  At worst, it is an ill-conceived – and arguably improper – 
backdoor attempt to override the Court of Appeal’s decision in Atherton and 
influence the California Supreme Court’s resolution of Eel River, which involves a 
repair project over which STB has no jurisdiction.  In either case, the Declaratory 
Order’s sweeping conclusion that “CEQA is categorically preempted” does not 
                                            
11




 STB issued the Declaratory Order pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) – also known as 
APA section 5(e) – which authorizes agencies to issue declaratory orders “to 
terminate a controversy or resolve uncertainty” in formal APA adjudications.  
“Adjudications” are “required by statute to be determined on the record after 
opportunity for an agency hearing.”  Id. § 554(a).  The Declaratory Order was not 
part of any APA “adjudication” before STB with respect to the High-Speed Rail 
project.      
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create original jurisdiction in this Court, where none otherwise exists, and is not a 
judicially reviewable final order from which legal consequences will flow.  
Accordingly, the Court should dismiss the petition. 
A.   The Court Should Dismiss the Petition for Lack of Jurisdiction.  
As a threshold matter, the Court should dismiss this case for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.  STB’s Declaratory Order was not the result of a statutorily-
authorized agency investigation, adjudication on a record, enforcement action, or 
licensing process over which this Court normally has Hobbs Act jurisdiction.  28 
U.S.C. § 2342.  Rather, it is an informal statement of STB’s legal views, couched 
as a “declaratory order” but unrelated to any agency proceeding, for which there is 
no federal jurisdiction.   
The subject matter of the Declaratory Order – which opines on the 
applicability of a federal preemption defense to pending state law CEQA claims –
does not affect jurisdiction, or the lack thereof.  Preemption is an affirmative 
defense properly heard in the underlying state court action and does not provide an 
independent basis for federal court jurisdiction.  See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 
482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987); Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation 
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 14 (1983), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1441(e); Californians for Alternatives to Toxics, 2012 WL 1610756, *8 & *11 
(remanding the Eel River case to state court for lack of federal jurisdiction).  Here, 
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the Authority can and did assert preemption as an affirmative defense in the 
pending state court CEQA actions.  STB cannot create independent federal 
jurisdiction to consider the very same defense again merely by issuing an 
interpretative statement.     
Nor does STB’s (arguably incorrect) invocation of APA section 5(e) 
establish jurisdiction.  The Attorney General’s Manual on the APA – which 
represents “the Government’s own most authoritative interpretation of the APA” 
and to which the U.S. Supreme Court has “repeatedly given great weight,” Bowen 
v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 218 (1988) – is instructive here.  It 
explains that agency authority over declaratory orders is akin to the authority of 
courts under the Declaratory Judgment Act: 
The purpose of section 5 (d) [now 5(e)], like that of the Declaratory 
Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. 400), is to develop predictability in the law.   
This grant of authority to the agencies to issue declaratory orders is 
limited by the introductory clause of section 5 so that such declaratory 
orders are authorized only with respect to matters which are required 
by statute to be determined “on the record after opportunity for an 
agency hearing.” 
Department of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative 
Procedures Act 59 (1947), available at http://archive.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/ 
1947iv.html.  As the Supreme Court held in Franchise Tax Bd., the Declaratory 
Judgment Act did not “extend” federal courts’ jurisdiction, but merely “enlarged 
the range of remedies available.”  463 U.S. at 15 (quoting Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips 
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Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950)).  Thus, “if, but for the availability of the 
declaratory judgment procedure, the federal claim would arise only as a defense to 
a state created action, jurisdiction is lacking.”  Id. at 16.   
The same analysis applies here.  STB’s issuance of a “declaratory order” 
under APA section 5(e) cannot transform an affirmative defense in a state court 
action into a claim arising under federal law over which federal courts may 
exercise jurisdiction.  It should not matter that the APA, and not the Declaratory 
Judgment Act, provides the vehicle by which STB action is now being reviewed.  
See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 18-20 (applying the Skelly Oil rule even 
though the claim originated as a state declaratory claim – and not under the federal 
Declaratory Judgment Act – because not doing so would backdoor in state claims 
as federal claims simply by pleading a state declaratory claim).      
B. The Court Should Give Preclusive Effect to the Final State Court 
Judgment in Atherton. 
 
The Declaratory Order constitutes an improper attempt to collaterally attack 
the final judgment in Atherton, which should be given preclusive effect by this 
Court.  Indeed, STB’s action here is akin to the Federal Communications 
Commission’s “declaratory ruling” in Town of Deerfield, New York v. Fed. 
Communications Comm’n, 992 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1993), where the agency opined 
through a declaratory order that a local ordinance was preempted by federal law 
after the state court found that it was not preempted and a federal court gave 
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preclusive effect to the state court judgment.  The Second Circuit held that “in 
deciding to disregard or override the judgment” of the prior courts through a 
declaratory ruling, “the FCC contravened several statutory and constitutional 
principles.”  Id. at 427.   Deerfield concluded that (1) the state court had 
jurisdiction over, and concurrent authority to decide, petitioner’s preemption 
claims, and (2) a federal court must give preclusive effect to the state court 
judgment.  Id. at 428-29.  The FCC’s post-judgment attempt “to arrogate to itself 
the power to (a) review or (b) ignore the judgments of the courts” on the question 
of preemption was thus “impermissible.”  Id. at 30.   
Likewise here, the doctrine of collateral estoppel instructs that this Court 
should give no legal effect to STB’s belated Declaratory Order, which opines that 
Atherton was wrongly decided.  A “‘federal court must give to a state-court 
judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law 
of the State in which the judgment was rendered’ under the Constitution’s Full 
Faith and Credit Clause and under 28 U.S.C. § 1738.”  Holcombe v. Hosmer, 477 
F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of 
Ed., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984)).  “A party’s ability to relitigate an issue decided in a 
prior state court determination depends on the law of the state in which the earlier 
litigation occurred.”  Kinslow v. Ratzlaff, 158 F.3d 1104, 1105 (10th Cir. 1998).  
In California, collateral estoppel or issue preclusion attaches to bar relitigation of 
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the same issue where (1) the issue is identical to the one decided in the prior 
proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated and decided in a final ruling on the 
merits; and (3) the party barred by preclusion is the same as, or in privity with, the 
party in the prior proceeding.  Lucido v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 335, 341 
(1990).  In this case, the Authority fully litigated the preemption issue in Atherton 
and elected not to pursue further judicial relief, rendering that Court of Appeal 
decision final and binding on the Authority as to the High-Speed Rail project.  
STB’s post-judgment disagreement with the state court’s reasoning cannot override 
or alter the judicial decision and thus should not be afforded any legal effect. 
C. The Declaratory Order Does Not Constitute a Judicially-
Reviewable “Final Order” Under the Hobbs Act.      
 
Even if this Court has subject matter jurisdiction, STB’s Declaratory Order 
does not constitute a judicially reviewable “final order” under the Hobbs Act.  28 
U.S.C. §§ 2342, 2344.  The Hobbs Act “final order” requirement “is analytically 
equivalent” to the APA’s “final agency action” requirement and must, therefore, be 
evaluated under the finality factors articulated in Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177-78.  US 
West Communications, Inc. v. Hamilton, 224 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2000).  
The second Bennett factor – whether the agency action is “one by which rights or 
obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow” – 
is not satisfied here because the Declaratory Order is nothing more than an 
advisory opinion intended to second-guess a final state court judgment.  
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As this Court explained in dismissing a petition for review that challenged 
the Federal Communication Commission’s failure to issue a requested declaratory 
order:  
[E]ven if the FCC had issued a general declaratory order as the Coalition 
requested, any review by this court would amount to an advisory opinion 
prohibited under Article III of the Constitution.  While the FCC might 
properly issue such a general declaration which does not settle an actual 
controversy between adverse parties, this court cannot.  As the Supreme 
Court has explained, “This Court ... reviews judgments, not statements in 
opinions.... However appropriate it may be for an administrative agency to 
write broadly in an adjudicatory proceeding, federal courts have never been 
empowered to issue advisory opinions.” 
Coalition for a Healthy California v. F.C.C., 87 F.3d 383, 386 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(citations omitted).   
For the same reason, the Court has declined to review an Army Corps’ 
“jurisdictional determination” as to the applicability of the Clean Water Act:  
[The determination] does not itself command Fairbanks to do or forbear 
from anything; as a bare statement of the agency’s opinion, it can be neither 
the subject of “immediate compliance” nor of defiance.  Up to the present, 
the Corps has “expresse[d] its view of what the law requires” of Fairbanks 
without altering or otherwise fixing its legal relationship.  This expression of 
views lacks the “status of law or comparable legal force.”  
 
Fairbanks North Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 543 F.3d 586, 
593-94 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted); see also e.g., Belle Co. v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, 761 F.3d 383, 394 (5th Cir. 2014) cert. denied sub nom. Kent 
Recycling Servs., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 135 S. Ct. 1548 (2015) 
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(Army Corps jurisdictional determination does not “alter the legal regime” as 
required by Bennett). 
 While STB is entitled to opine on any subject, it does not have statutory 
authority, or any particular competence, to decide the important federalism and 
state sovereignty issues that undergird preemption analysis.  As explained above, 
the Termination Act limits STB’s jurisdiction and regulatory authority to (1) 
certifying new or expanded lines, new operators of an existing line, and 
abandonment of old lines and (2) adjudicating common carrier disputes.  While 
STB frequently offers its opinion on preemption in connection with its license 
proceedings, the agency has no special expertise in relevant state laws, like CEQA 
and Proposition 1A, or in balancing national and state interests.  See generally 
Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 869 (2008) (arguing 
that preemption doctrine is a particularly important safeguard for protecting state 
autonomy and the constitutional concept of federalism and that democratically 
unaccountable federal agencies have strong incentives to overread their statutory 
authority).  Indeed, as discussed below, STB has confused the preemption doctrine 
with dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, using that error to significant 
expand its own jurisdiction at the expense of local communities and in 
contradiction to clear congressional intent to limit the agency’s reach.   
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       The recent decision in American Tort Reform Ass’n v. Occupational Safety 
& Health Admin., 738 F.3d 387 (D.C. Cir. 2013), is particularly instructive.  
There, a tort reform organization challenged language in OSHA’s revised 
hazardous communication standard which reflected the agency’s view that the 
standard preempted state regulatory requirements but not state tort claims.  Id. at 
390.  Because OSHA has no explicit statutory authority to determine the 
preemptive effect of its organic act, the agency’s legal opinion regarding 
preemption was not a “legislative rule” with the “force of law,” but merely “an 
interpretative statement that ‘advise[s] the public of the agency's construction of 
the statute[ ] ... it administers.’”  Id. (quoting Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hosp., 
514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995)).  Like STB here, OSHA had issued numerous statements 
expressing its views on the preemptive effect of its hazardous communications 
standard and reiterated those statements in its revised final rule.  Id. at 391-92.  The 
Court held that such interpretative statements are not subject to judicial review 
unless OSHA relies on them to take action in a particular case: 
When an agency issues an interpretative rule or statement, an interpretative 
guideline, or a policy statement with respect to a matter that it is not 
empowered to decide, the interpretative rule, statement, guideline, or policy 
statement merely informs the public of the agency's views on the subject. It 
does not, however, create “adverse effects of a strictly legal kind” because it 
cannot “command anyone to do anything or to refrain from doing anything.”  
As a result, controversies over such interpretative rules, statements, 
guidelines, and policy statements typically cannot result in justiciable 
disputes. 
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Id. at 393 (quoting National Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior, 538 
U.S. 803, 809 (2003)). 
Here, STB’s own filings on the High-Speed Rail project concede that the 
agency has no legal authority to require that California construct a new rail line 
and no business instructing state decision-makers on the viability of such an 
endeavor; its only role is to permissively respond to the state’s application for 
federal certification of construction when a new line connects to the existing 
interstate rail system.  2013 WL 3053064 , at *12 (this action is “permissive,” not 
“mandatory”).  Moreover, while acknowledging that the state’s decisions are 
governed by state laws like CEQA and Proposition 1A over which it has no 
expertise, STB nevertheless offers its “views” that CEQA is “categorically 
preempted” by the Termination Act – a sweeping legal opinion that seeks to 
expand federal law beyond anything Congress envisioned and to limit the ability of 
states and local communities to make their own decisions in a way that protects 
their residents, their treasury, and their environment.  Because the Declaratory 
Order, issued solely to contradict a final state court judgment, has no legal effect, 
this Court should conclude that it is not a judicially reviewable “final order” under 
the Hobbs Act.  
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II. The Court Should Abstain from Deciding this Case in Recognition of 
Important State Interests in Environmental Protection. 
Even if this case is properly before the Court, it should abstain from 
reaching the merits until resolution of the parallel Eel River case, which raises 
substantially similar preemption issues.  Although various mandatory abstention 
doctrines arguably apply here – Petitioners, for instance, address both Pullman and 
Burford abstention – the prudential abstention doctrine articulated in Colorado 
River Water Conservation District v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800 (1976), is also directly 
relevant to the facts of this case.  There, after finding that no formal abstention 
doctrine squarely applied, the Supreme Court nevertheless dismissed the case on 
consideration of “[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of 
judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.”  Id. at 817 (internal 
quotations and citation omitted). 
This Court has developed an eight-factor test for assessing whether Colorado 
River warrants abstention, six of which are relevant here:   
(1) the desire to avoid piecemeal litigation; (2) the order in which the 
forums obtained jurisdiction; (3) whether federal law or state law 
provides the rule of decision on the merits; (4) whether the state court 
proceedings can adequately protect the rights of the federal litigants; 
(5) the desire to avoid forum shopping; and (6) whether the state court 
proceedings will resolve all issues before the federal court.  
 
R.R. St. & Co. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 656 F.3d 966, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2011) (numbers 
altered from (3)-(8) to (1)-(6)).  All of these factors favor abstention here.   
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A. State Interests Are Paramount in the Pending CEQA Litigation, 
Favoring Abstention. 
As a threshold matter, abstention is warranted because the pending Eel River 
case and the seven stayed High-Speed Rail CEQA cases implicate important state 
interests.  See United States v. California, 639 F. Supp. 199, 204 (E.D. Cal. 1986) 
(relying on Younger, Pullman, and Colorado River abstention principles to dismiss 
case in similar posture because “California has a fundamental interest” in (1) 
“enforcing its Environmental Quality Act,” and (2) “the efficient operation of its 
state court system”).  In that case, the federal government brought a declaratory 
and injunctive relief action seeking to enjoin, on federal preemption grounds, 
California and its Attorney General from enforcing CEQA against an airline.  
Dismissing on abstention grounds, the court explained that the federal suit “in 
effect, would nullify” a state trial court decision – then on appeal – that CEQA 
applied, “would result in a serious interference with the fundamental operation of 
the state court system,” and would wade into “a sensitive area of social policy [of 
enforcement of environmental laws] into which a federal court should not intrude 
unnecessarily.”  Id. at 200-01, 206-07. 
Similarly, in Woodfeathers, Inc. v. Washington Cty., 180 F.3d 1017 (9th 
Cir. 1999), this Court dismissed an action challenging the constitutionality of an 
enforcement action based on a county solid waste ordinance, citing Younger 
abstention principles, because the pending state appeal “implicates important state 
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interests.”  Id. at 1021.  See also Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. 
DiGregorio, 811 F.2d 1249, 1253 & nn.4-5 (9th Cir. 1987) (upholding abstention 
where litigant attempted to use declaratory action in response to state court action 
“to deprive a plaintiff of his choice of forum or to encourage a race to judgment” in 
federal court; citing long line of 9th Cir. cases disapproving of such maneuvers); 
FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc. v. Ingenito, 86 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1124 & 1127 
(E.D. Cal. 2015) (FedEx’s federal declaratory judgment action in anticipation of a 
state civil enforcement action – later filed, alleging violations of the state 
hazardous waste laws – dismissed; important state interest in the exercise of police 
powers in “matters relating to public health” present).   
The question in these abstention cases is not whether the state law at issue is 
preempted, but whether preemption is “readily apparent” on the face of the record 
before the Court.  Woodfeathers, 180 F.3d at 1021-22.  Here, the issue of whether 
CEQA preempts the state’s internal decision-making process before a rail line is 
built or operated is an issue of first impression before the California Supreme 
Court, with two split appellate decisions.  Thus, federal preemption is not readily 
apparent on the record before this Court, and abstention is warranted. 
B. The Remaining Colorado River Factors Also Favor Abstention. 
Here, the interest in avoiding piecemeal litigation, the order in which the  
state courts obtained jurisdiction, the state courts’ ability to afford the Authority 
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full relief, and the interest in discouraging forum shopping all favor abstention.   
“Piecemeal litigation occurs when different tribunals consider the same 
issue, thereby duplicating efforts and possibly reaching different results.”  Am. Int'l 
Underwriters, (Philippines), Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 1253, 1258 (9th 
Cir.1988).  A decision by this Court plainly would be duplicative of Atherton, the 
other stayed High-Speed Rail CEQA challenges, and Eel River – all cases that the 
state courts are fully competent to hear and that are, in fact, being adjudicated.  The 
Atherton and Eel River cases, as well as the other (now-stayed) CEQA challenges 
to the adequacy of the Authority’s EIR, have been pending for several years and 
preceded the Authority’s eleventh-hour Petition for Declaratory Order, STB’s 
Declaratory Order itself, and Appellants’ Petition for Review to this Court.  See, 
e.g., Authority’s Petition for Declaratory Order at 4, n.2 (“Each of the [seven state 
CEQA] lawsuits is currently in the Superior Court for the State of California, 
Sacramento County”).  The parallel legal issues raised by STB’s Declaratory Order 
are now squarely before the California Supreme Court and should be decided there.   
In the end, the Authority’s Petition for Declaratory Order to STB amounts to 
nothing more than transparent “forum shopping” to circumvent proper state court 
jurisdiction in the pending High-Speed Rail cases and the Eel River case.  See, e.g, 
Cerit v. Cerit, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1251 (D. Haw. 2002) (describing classic 
forum shopping as filing in federal court in an attempt to obtain a different result).  
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That forum shopping “weighs strongly in favor of abstention.”  See Nakash v. 
Marciano, 882 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1989).  Thus, the Court should abstain 




III.  On the Merits, There Is No Termination Act Preemption in This Case. 
If the Court reaches the merits of the Declaratory Order, it should conduct a 
full and proper federal preemption analysis, applying the standards articulated by 
the Supreme Court, not the short-cut evaluation presented by STB.  Such an 
analysis leads inextricably to the conclusion that there is no federal preemption in 
this case. 
A.  Courts Must Proceed with Caution in Finding Preemption. 
 
Federal preemption analysis “must be guided by two cornerstones of [the 
Supreme Court’s] pre-emption jurisprudence.”  Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 
565 (2009).  First, preemption is fundamentally a question of congressional intent.  
Id. (citing Medtronics, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).  To determine the 
                                            
13
 Dismissal here is also consistent with Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co. of 
America, 316 U.S. 491, 494-95 (1942) (court has discretion to dismiss a 
declaratory judgment action when “the questions in controversy . . . can better be 
settled in” a pending state court proceeding), and Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 
U.S. 227, 289-90 (1995) (court may decline to entertain a federal declaratory 
judgment action when state court proceedings “‘present[] opportunity for 
ventilation of the same state law issues’”).  The three factors relevant in making a 
Brillhart/Wilton determination are (1) avoiding needless determination of state law 
issues; (2) discouraging forum shopping; and (3) avoiding duplicative litigation.  
Government Employees Ins, Co., v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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scope of preemption, courts look not only to the preemption clause, but also to the 
statutory structure and purpose.  Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 588; Medtronics, 518 U.S. at 
486.  Second, in all preemption cases, courts “start with the presumption that the 
states’ historic police powers shall not be superseded by federal law unless that is 
shown to be the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”  Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).  This presumption applies “particularly” 
where “Congress has ‘legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally 
occupied.’”  Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565; see also Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n v. 
Harris, 794 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2015).   
With respect to environmental matters, states have unquestionably retained 
their sovereign police powers “to adopt a wide range of laws in order to protect the 
health, safety, and welfare of its own residents.”  Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass’n 
v. Goldstene, 639 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 22 
(2012).  CEQA is a law so adopted.  Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21000 (“The 
maintenance of a quality environment for the people of this state now and in the 
future is a matter of statewide concern.”).  The party seeking to overcome the 
presumption against preemption thus bears a heavy burden.  De Buono v. NYSA–
ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 814 (1997).  The scope of 
preemption, if any, is to be determined while keeping this presumption in mind.  
Medtronics, 518 U.S. at 485.  That is, because states are “independent sovereigns,” 
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courts “have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law 
causes of action.”  Id.  Accordingly, “[t]he applicable preemption provision must 
be read narrowly ‘in light of the presumption against pre-emption of state police 
power regulations.’”  Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (2008) 
(quotations omitted).    
B. The Termination Act Does Not Expressly Preempt CEQA. 
 
On its face, section 10501(b) of the Termination Act does not expressly – or 
“categorically” – preempt CEQA.  It states:  “Except as otherwise provided in this 
part, the remedies provided under this part with respect to regulation of rail 
transportation are exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under Federal or 
State law.”  49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (emphasis added).  CEQA does not regulate rail 
transportation or provide any remedy with respect to the “regulation” of rail 
“transportation.”
14
  And it certainly does not implicate the economic regulation of 
rates, schedules, and classifications with which Congress was concerned when it 
drafted the preemption language in the Staggers Act, as recodified substantially 
unchanged in the Termination Act.  Rather, CEQA is a state environmental 
                                            
14
 “Transportation” is defined as “related to the movement of passengers or 
property, or both, by rail” and “services related to that movement.”  49 U.S.C. 
§ 10102(5), (9).  Even if CEQA’s environmental review and disclosure obligations 
are considered regulations, they are not related to rail movements.  See Dan’s City 
Used Car, Inc. v. Pelkey, 133 S. Ct. 1769, 1779 (2013) (state consumer and tort 
claims are not related to “movement” under a similar statute). 
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disclosure law which, in this case, must be satisfied before the Authority moves 
forward with planning and funding a public railroad.           
As other courts have found, “Congress narrowly tailored the [Termination 
Act] preemption provision to displace only ‘regulation,’ i.e., those state laws that 
may reasonably be said to have the effect of ‘managing’ or ‘governing’ rail 
transportation, while permitting the continued application of laws having a more 
remote or incidental effect on rail transportation.”  Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. 
City of West Palm Beach, 266 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2001).  This plain 
language analysis “is bolstered by the history and purpose of the ICCTA itself,” 
which shows that the Termination Act’s statutory changes “reflect the focus of 
legislative attention on removing direct economic regulation by the States, as 
opposed to the incidental effects that inhere in the exercise of traditionally local 
police powers such as zoning.”  Id. at 1337.  As the Third Circuit has explained:  
The Termination Act regulates, inter alia, rail carriers’ rates, terms of 
service, accounting practices, ability to merge with one another, and 
authority to acquire and construct rail lines. . . . Thus it regulates the 
economics and finances of the rail carriage industry—and provides a 
panoply of remedies when rail carriers break the rules. 
 
New York Susquehanna & W. Ry. Corp. v. Jackson, 500 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 
2007) (noting that “the Act’s subject matter is limited to deregulation of the 
railroad industry”); see also Illinois Commerce Comm’n v. Interstate Commerce 
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Comm’n, 879 F.2d 917, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Staggers Act’s “central focus” was 
“economic regulation of railroads”). 
STB’s preemption analysis in the Declaratory Order confuses the agency’s 
“public convenience and necessity” licensing jurisdiction over construction of new 
lines with the separate and different preemption language related to “regulation of 
rail transportation.”  STB insists that section 10501(b) “prevents states or localities 
from intruding into matters that are directly regulated by the Board (e.g., rail 
carrier rates, services, construction, and abandonment).”  2014 WL 7149612, *6.  
The “e.g.,” clause in this statement is simply wrong as a matter of statutory 
construction.  While STB regulates and adjudicates carrier rates and services under 
sections 10701-10747, it does not regulate or engage in planning for rail line 
construction and abandonment.  Rather, under sections 10901-10910, STB 
permissively licenses these components of the interstate system in response to 
carrier applications to ensure against overbuilding and monopolistic behavior.  For 
public and private railroads alike, all of the planning and funding that precedes 
new line construction and existing line rehabilitation is governed by state and local 
land use and financial requirements.  STB’s only role is to certify (or not) these 
planned infrastructure improvements as appropriate for the interstate rail system.   
By conflating jurisdiction with preemption and then overstating the reach of 
its certification jurisdiction, STB reaches the erroneous – and, frankly, startling – 
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legal conclusion that all “state or local permitting or preclearance requirements, 
including environmental permitting or preclearance requirements, are categorically 
preempted as to any rail lines or facilities.”  2014 WL 7149612, *6.  STB’s 
expansive interpretation is entirely at odds with the Supreme Court’s cautious 
preemption jurisprudence and with this Court’s admonition that “because 
‘everything is related to everything else,’ . . . understanding the nuances of 
congressional intent is particularly important” for preemption analysis.  Dilts v. 
Penske Logistics, LLC, 769 F.3d 637, 643 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting California Div. 
of Labor Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham Const., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 335 
(1997) (Scalia, J., concurring)).   
In Dilts, the Court interpreted the statutory preemption language of the 
Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (“FAAAA”) – a statute which, 
like the Termination Act, borrowed language from the Airline Deregulation Act 
with the intent of facilitating reliance on competitive market forces and ensuring 
that states would not undo federal deregulation efforts.  769 F.3d at 643-44.  
Similar to Termination Act section 10501(b), the FAAAA provides that “States 
may not enact or enforce a law . . . related to a price, route, or service of any motor 
carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property.”  49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).  
Dilts narrowly read “with respect to transportation” to preempt state laws that 
“operate at the point where carriers provide services to customers at specific 
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prices,” but not “generally applicable background regulations that are several steps 
removed from prices, routes, or services . . . even if employers must factor those 
provisions into their decisions about the prices that they set, the routes that they 
use, or the services that they provide.”  769 F.3d at 646.  “Such laws are not 
preempted even if they raise the overall cost of doing business or require a carrier 
to re-direct or reroute some equipment.”  Id.   
The same logic applies here.  CEQA is a generally applicable background 
law for public projects, and it operates at the pre-project planning stage, not at the 
point where carriers provide rail transportation services to shippers at specific 
prices.  The fact that environmental disclosure and mitigation may alter a proposed 
rail project or make it more costly is irrelevant to the express preemption analysis.  
Indeed, if STB’s “categorical preemption” argument were correct, then the joint 
NEPA process in which the Federal Railroad Administration engaged here would 
likewise be preempted, as would STB’s own NEPA processes, because section 
10501(b) applies equally to “remedies provided under Federal and State law.”  Just 
as a successful CEQA enforcement action may temporarily enjoin and delay a 
proposed rail project while the public agency corrects errors in an EIR, a 
successful NEPA challenge may prompt a federal court to “hold unlawful and set 
aside” a defective EIS.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2).         
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Wisely, STB has never argued that NEPA compliance and enforcement is 
preempted.  In fact, STB has promulgated its own NEPA regulations to guide 
various Termination Act decisions, 49 C.F.R. §§ 1105.1-1105.12, and this Court 
routinely reviews the adequacy of STB’s NEPA compliance.  Alaska Survival v. 
Surface Transp. Bd., 705 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2013); Northern Plains Res. Council, 
Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 668 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2011).  If NEPA review of rail 
projects is compatible with the language of section 10501(b), so too is CEQA 
review. 
C. Compliance with CEQA Does Not Frustrate or Conflict with 
Congressional Intent Behind the Termination Act. 
 
STB also fundamentally erred in its implied – or “as applied” – preemption 
analysis.  As a threshold matter, it is worth noting that the Declaratory Order 
applies the wrong test for implied preemption.  Implied “conflict pre-emption 
exists where ‘compliance with both state and federal law is impossible,’ or where 
‘the state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”  Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
1591, 1595 (2015) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  The Declaratory 
Order misstates this test, suggesting that state laws are impliedly preempted “if 
they would have the effect of unreasonably burdening or interfering with rail 
transportation, which is a fact-specific determination based on the circumstances of 
each case.”  2014 WL 7149612, *6.  STB’s much broader “unreasonable burden” 
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standard seems to have been borrowed from Commerce Clause jurisprudence, see 
National Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris, 682 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (“[a] critical requirement for proving a violation of the dormant 
Commerce Clause is that there must be a substantial burden on interstate 
commerce”), although no party has raised concerns here that the High-Speed Rail 
project constitutes state economic protectionism.  See Rocky Mountain Farmers 
Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1087 (9th Cir. 2013) (in contrast to the preemption 
doctrine, explaining the modern dormant Commerce Clause “is driven by concern 
about ‘economic protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit 
in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors’”). 
In any event, the Supreme Court in Oneok emphasized “the importance of 
considering the target at which the state law aims in determining whether that law 
is pre-empted.”  135 S. Ct. at 1599.  There, the Court held that a state antitrust 
lawsuit for false price reporting, wash trades, and anticompetitive collusive 
behavior was not preempted by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s 
jurisdiction over interstate natural gas rates, including federal authority to issue 
rules and regulations to prevent “any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance” for interstate sales.  Id. at 1601.  In so holding, the Court emphasized 
that the target of the antitrust lawsuit (collusive retail rates) was properly 
actionable under a state law of general applicability, even though application of 
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that law “might well raise pipelines’ operating costs, and thus the costs of 
wholesale natural gas transportation.”  Id. at 1601.   
Similarly, the Supreme Court held in Dan’s City that state law consumer 
protection claims were not within the “target at which [Congress] aimed” in the 
FAAAA; that target was “a State’s direct substitution of its own governmental 
commands for competitive market forces.”  133 S. Ct. at 1774.  As this Court 
acknowledged in Dilts, the Termination Act takes aim at the same target.   
Dan’s City and Oneok are directly relevant here.  As was true for the 
generally applicable state law at issue in each of them, CEQA does not target rail 
transportation or stand as an obstacle to accomplishing Congress’ intent to 
deregulate the rail industry and make the market more competitive.  CEQA 
generally targets environmentally sound and transparent decision-making by public 
officials, and in this case, specifically targets full accountability by a public agency 
spending billions of taxpayer dollars to build an ambitious public rail project.  The 
fact that a CEQA enforcement action could delay the High-Speed Rail project or 
compel the Authority to evaluate other alternatives or mitigation measures does not 
alter the relevant legal analysis for conflict preemption, which does not exist here.   
D. STB’s Legal Interpretation Is Not Entitled to Deference.   
As the Supreme Court noted in Wyeth, agencies have “no special authority 
to pronounce on pre-emption absent delegation by Congress.”  555 U.S. at 577.  
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Unlike some federal statutes, the Termination Act does not convey authority on 
STB to interpret the scope of federal preemption under section 10501(b).  See, e.g., 
21 U.S.C. § 360k (authorizing FDA to determine the scope of the Medical Devices 
Amendment’s pre-emption clause); 30 U.S.C. § 1254(g) (authorizing Secretary of 
the Interior to determine preemption under federal surface coal mining program); 
47 U.S.C. § 253(d) (authorizing FCC to determine that a state or local law is 
preempted); 49 U.S.C. § 5125(d) (authorizing Secretary of Transportation to 
determine preemption under Hazardous Materials Transportation Act).  The weight 
afforded STB’s interpretation of the preemption clause depends, therefore, on its 
thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness.  Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 577.   
For the reasons identified above, no deference to STB’s preemption analysis 
is warranted here.  First, although STB is an agency of limited authority with no 
congressional mandate for comprehensive planning or plenary infrastructure 
regulation, it improperly used the APA’s “declaratory order” vehicle, outside the 
confines of any adjudicatory proceeding, to override the preclusive effect of a final 
state court decision, at the behest of the unsuccessful party.  Second, the 
Declaratory Order conflated STB’s historic rate regulation power with its much 
more limited infrastructure licensing jurisdiction in opting for a broadly 
preemptive regime that would abrogate the states’ traditional planning and funding 
authority for public rail projects.  Third, STB failed to apply the Supreme Court’s 
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preemption jurisprudence, instead invoking dormant Commerce Clause principles 
to analyze implied preemption.  And fourth, the Declaratory Order’s truncated 
preemption discussion effectively ignored applicable rules of construction (e.g., 
presumption against preemption, congressional intent), as well as relevant recent 
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent.  These serious defects render STB’s 
interpretation wholly unpersuasive.   
At the end of the day, STB’s position is perhaps best encapsulated in its 
admonition that CEQA “could be used to deny or significantly delay an entity’s 
right to construct a line that the Board has specifically authorized, thus impinging 
upon the Board’s exclusive jurisdiction over rail transportation.”  2014 WL 
7149612, *7.  This statement improperly seeks to expand STB’s limited role in the 
construction of new rail lines beyond anything that Congress envisioned when it 
terminated the Interstate Commerce Commission and deregulated the economics of 
the rail industry.  Although STB has permissive discretion to certify a new line as 
part of the interstate rail system in response to a license application, the agency has 
no statutory power to create a “right to construct” new lines in violation of state 
law.  Nor can STB commandeer the California state treasury to compel the 
financing and completion of a proposed new line prior to full compliance with the 
state’s bedrock environmental disclosure law – a project condition that the voters 
themselves mandated.  With issuance of the Declaratory Order, STB has 
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overstepped and overreached – and offered defective legal reasoning for its 
conclusions.  Accordingly, the Court should not accord any deference to STB’s 
flawed legal opinion. 
CONCLUSION 
 Amicus Curiae respectfully requests that the Court dismiss, or in the 
alternative stay resolution of, this case.  If the Court reaches the merits, it should 
hold that the Termination Act does not expressly or impliedly preempt CEQA in 
this case. 
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